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ABSTRACT: When one wishes to implement public policies, there is a previous need of comparing 
different actions and valuating and evaluating them to assess their social attractiveness. Recently 
the concept of well-being has been proposed as a multidimensional proxy for measuring societal 
prosperity and progress; a key research topic is then on how we can measure and evaluate this 
plurality of dimensions for policy decisions. This paper defends the thesis articulated in the 
following points:  
1. Different metrics are linked to different objectives and values. To use only one measurement 
unit (on the grounds of the so-called commensurability principle) for incorporating a plurality 
of dimensions, objectives and values, implies reductionism necessarily. 
2. Point 1) can be proven as a matter of formal logic by drawing on the work of Geach about 
moral philosophy. This theoretical demonstration is an original contribution of this article.  
Here the distinction between predicative and attributive adjectives is formalised and defini-
tions are provided. Predicative adjectives are further distinguished into absolute and relative 
ones. The new concepts of set commensurability and rod commensurability are introduced 
too. 
3. The existence of a plurality of social actors, with interest in the policy being assessed, 
causes that social decisions involve multiple types of values, of which economic efficiency is 
only one. Therefore it is misleading to make social decisions based only on that one value.   
4. Weak comparability of values, which is grounded on incommensurability, is proved to be the 
main methodological foundation of policy evaluation in the framework of well-being 
economics. Incommensurability does not imply incomparability; on the contrary 
incommensurability is the only rational way to compare societal options under a plurality of 
policy objectives.  
5. Weak comparability can be implemented by using multi-criteria evaluation, which is a formal 
framework for applied consequentialism under incommensurability. Social Multi-Criteria 
Evaluation, in particular, allows considering both technical and social incommensurabilities 
simultaneously.  
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“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, 
it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, 
it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, 
it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, 
it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair,  
we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, 
we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct  
to the other way – in short, the period was so far like the present period,  
that some of its noisiest authorities insisted 
on its being received, for good or for evil, in the 
superlative degree of comparison only”. 
 
 
Charles Dickens – A Tale of Two Cities, Signet Classic, New American 
Library, New York, 1960, p. 13. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
    Economic development implies the creation of new assets in terms of physical, social and 
economic structures. Within a process of “creative destruction” traditional environmental, social, 
and cultural assets derived from a society’s common heritage may disappear. The existence of a 
plurality of social actors, with interest in the policy being assessed, generates a conflictual 
situation. ”...  Looking at a single individual, ... He is prevented from being better off than he is, not 
only because total production is limited, but also because so much of total production is at the 
disposal of persons other than himself. The same thing holds, of course, for any group or society of 
individuals, so long as that group is less than the totality of a closed community” (Hicks, 1939, p. 
698-699). An obvious question to start with here is then: how can we evaluate the societal 
attractiveness of different policy options?  
 
    When one wishes to implement public policies, there is a previous need of comparing different 
actions and valuating and evaluating them to assess their social attractiveness. One of the key 
tasks of welfare economics is exactly this valuation and evaluation exercise. To define what exact-
ly valuation and evaluation connote is not an easy task, “ … we value when comparing objects and 
evaluate when comparing the relative merits of actions. ... There is a sense in which valuation is 
passive, while evaluation signifies more of an active engagement. We frequently value in order to 
evaluate. But not always. We sometimes value simply because we wish to understand a state of 
affairs, such as the quality of life in a country. Welfare economics studies life's quality, valuing 
objects and evaluating policies being only a means to measuring the quality of life and to 
discovering ways to improve it” (Dasgupta, 2001, p. C1).   
 
   Traditional welfare economics proposes the measurement of social costs and benefits made on 
the basis of the so called compensation principle (usually associated with the names of Kaldor 
(1939) and Hicks (1939). According to this principle, the social cost of a given event is defined as 
the sum of money paid as compensation to those who have been suffered damage. The level of 
utility that the damaged had before the event took place should determine the amount of 
compensation to pay. Although there are symbolic goods without any possibility of transactions in 
actual or fictitious markets surely. Who would be willing to accept compensation for the destruction 
of the Big Ben, the Sagrada Familia, the Statue of Liberty or the Coliseum? Indeed Kaldor admitted 
the existence of such losses of a non-pecuniary kind: “... individuals might, as a result of a certain 
political action, sustain losses of a non-pecuniary kind- e.g., if workers derive satisfaction from their 
particular kind of work, and are obliged to change their employment, something more than their 
previous level of money income will be necessary to secure their previous level of enjoyment; and 
the same applies in cases where individuals feel that the carrying out of the policy involves an 
interference with their individual freedom” (Kaldor, 1939, p. 551). 
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 Hicks made very clear the point that economic welfare and social welfare are very different 
concepts. In fact he considered a theoretical weakness “… when the reader is asked to accept a 
direct correlation between economic welfare and social welfare in general (whatever that may be). 
This is not easy to swallow; in any case it is open to the positivist objection that it reflects a 
particular social outlook, held by certain classes at certain times, and never likely to be acceptable 
universally” (Hicks, 1939, p. 697).  In recent years, such a concept of social welfare, which Hicks 
did not appreciate so much for its subjectivity, has gained increasing popularity. A growing quantity 
of literature has been written about concepts such as multidimensional poverty (Sen, 1979, 1985; 
Duclos et al., 2006), quality of life, happiness and well-being (e.g. Easterlin, 1995, 2001; Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002; Michalos, 1980, 1997). This tendency has even increased after the influential 
Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009) report, which proposed the use of the concept of well-being as a 
proxy for measuring societal prosperity and progress.   
 
 A relevant question is hence the following: what are the perspectives to build, on the existing 
knowledge and consensus, alternative measures of public policy attractiveness which account for 
the concept of well-being? A starting point may be to connect well-being research agenda with the 
sustainability one. This allows us to draw upon results already established in the literature and 
widely accepted by the political and scientific communities; as stated by Arrow et al., (2012), “… 
Much of the literature on sustainable development has taken human wellbeing to be the object to 
be sustained.” One shared non-controversial result of the sustainability literature is that 
sustainability is a multidimensional concept, which should at least include economic, social, 
environmental and institutional dimensions.  
 
The multidimensional nature of well-being is also taken for granted by Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 
(2009, pp. 14, 15) “To define what well-being means a multidimensional definition has to be used. 
Based on academic research and a number of concrete initiatives developed around the world, the 
Commission has identified the following key dimensions that should be taken into account. At least 
in principle, these dimensions should be considered simultaneously: 
i. Material living standards (income, consumption and wealth); 
ii. Health; 
iii. Education; 
iv. Personal activities including work 
v. Political voice and governance; 
vi. Social connections and relationships; 
vii. Environment (present and future conditions); 
viii. Insecurity, of an economic as well as a physical nature.” 
 
 The next point to deal with is whether there is a multidimensional evaluation framework able to 
cope with all these issues simultaneously.  I think that in the economic literature there is some 
confusion on this issue. In this article I will develop theoretical arguments to prove the desirability 
of such a multidimensional framework and I will show its existence. In the next Section, I will 
introduce the concept of commensurability and I will prove that its applicability is very limited. 
Section 3 will introduce the incommensurability principle as a methodological foundation and an 
analytic justification of Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation, which is considered as a possible practical 
framework for well-being policy analysis and in Section 4, some conclusions will be drawn. 
 
 
2. The commensurability principle as the methodological foundation of comparability 
   
 
 Traditionally, from a philosophical perspective, it is possible to distinguish between the concepts 
of strong comparability (there exists a single comparative term by which all different actions can 
be ranked) implying strong commensurability (a common measure of the various consequences 
of an action based on a interval or ratio scale of measurement, such as money or energy) or weak 
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commensurability (a common measure based on an ordinal scale of measurement, such as 
consumer’s utility),  and weak comparability, which implies incommensurability i.e. there is an 
irreducible value conflict when deciding what common comparative term should be used to rank 
alternative options; this irreducible value conflict is unavoidable but compatible with rational choice 
employing, for example, multi-criteria evaluation (Chang, 1997; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Munda, 
2004; O'Neill, 1993; Rabinowicz, 2012; Raz, 1986). 
 
 In this article, I introduce the new concepts of set and rod commensurability. Let us consider the 
basic example of apples and oranges, we all learn at primary school. Normally we are thought that 
we cannot sum up them unless we find a common unit of measurement, i.e. their price or the fact 
that they both belong to the set of fruits.  Commensurability, a necessary condition for strong 
comparability, can then be implemented in two different ways: 
 
1. By looking for a more general category (set) that can contain all the characteristics of the 
objects we wish to compare; these characteristics are described by using adjectives. I 
define this as “set commensurability” (e.g. apples and oranges are legitimately lumped 
together as fruit, along with grapes, bananas, etc.).  
2. By finding one property common to all objects to be compared and measurable by using 
one measurement unit; obviously comparison of objects is possible according to the 
characteristics of this property only. I define this as “rod commensurability” which can be 
divided into “factual” (e.g. since different types of fruits contain sugar, and this can be 
significant when their juice is extracted for drinking as a liquid; and for this purpose they can 
be compared with sugarcane, sugar beet, etc.) and “potential” (if one desires to build an 
ecologically corrected GDP, there is the need to include non-market goods and services, 
thus their price has, to some extent, to be invented) ones.  
 
 Of course, when possible, set commensurability is the most attractive one since apparently no 
information is lost in the comparison process, while rod commensurability always requires a kind of 
reductionism. Let us then start by examining the first approach. Let us start by considering the 
famous Aristotle’s syllogism: All human beings are mortal, all philosophers are human beings, 
Socrates is a philosopher thus Socrates is mortal. By using formal logic, the same syllogism can 
be written as follows: 
 
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x H x M x
x F x H x
x F x M x
x F x M x
  
  
  
  
                                                                                                                    (1) 
 
Clearly here the point is to define an adjective that all elements of the set must present as a 
necessary property; independently on the subsets they may belong (e.g. a human being is mortal if 
she/he is a philosopher, a politician or a tennis player). 
 
Let us now look at the following statements:  
   
a)"X is a red-headed basketball player, all basketball players are persons, and therefore X is red-
headed person". 
 
1
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x B x R x
x B x H x
x H x R x
  
  
  
                                                                                                                       (2) 
 
b) "X is an old basketball player, all basketball players are persons, and therefore X is an old 
person". 
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1
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x B x O x
x B x H x
x H x O x
  
  
  
                                                                                                                      (3) 
 
c) "X is a small basketball player, all basketball players are persons, and therefore X is a small 
person". 
 
1
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x B x S x
x B x H x
x H x S x
  
  
  
                                                                                                                      (4) 
 
d) "X is a good basketball player, all basketball players are persons, and therefore X is a good 
person". 
 
1
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x B x G x
x B x H x
x H x G x
  
  
  
                                                                                                                      (5) 
  
I believe that most readers would agree on the validity of statements a) but very a few would 
accept statement d) as a correct way of reasoning, although syllogisms from (2) to (5) are all 
formally correct. In implementing set commensurability, the problem is then to understand which 
adjectives describing an element can be generalised to the whole set, without any logical or 
ontological mistake. Geach synthesises this issue very clearly: “Although a tennis stroke or a 
chess move is a human act, it does not follow that a good tennis stroke or a good chess move is a 
good human act, … “ (Geach, 1956, p. 37).  
 
 Here the question is: when set commensurability is logically possible and correct? Geach's 
(1956) distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives can help us in answering this 
question. In Geach’s own words: “There are familiar examples of what I call attributive adjectives. 
Big and small are attributive; x is a big flea does not split up into x is a flea and x is big, nor x is a 
small elephant into x is an elephant and x is small; for if these analyses were legitimate, a simple 
argument would show that a big flea is a big animal and a small elephant is a small animal. Again, 
the sort of adjective that the mediaevals called alienans is attributive; x is a forged banknote does 
not split up into x is a banknote and x is forged, nor x is the putative father of y into x is the father 
of y and x is putative. On the other hand, in the phrase a red book red is a predicative adjective in 
my sense, although not grammatically so, for is a red book logically splits up into is a book and is 
red.  
I can now state my first thesis about good and evil: good and bad are always attributive, not 
predicative, adjectives” (Geach, 1956, p. 32). 
 
 Even if Geach’s arguments were developed in the context of moral philosophy, they have an 
extraordinary explicative power for evaluation too. In fact, evaluation is all about an action a being 
declared better, worse or equal than another action b. However, although Geach saw the clear 
difference between predicative and attributive adjectives, he only gave examples of them but no 
general definition was provided. Here I try then to invent one; in my opinion, this way of reasoning 
can be generalised by defining the new concepts of absolute and relative predicative adjectives.  
  
 An adjective is absolute predicative if its meaning does not change in relation to the subsets 
considered. It is an intrinsic characteristic of the object considered. The characteristic of being a 
red-headed person does not change if we consider subsets such as police officers, politicians, 
scientists or basketball players. In terms of measurement theory (see e.g. Roberts, 1979), an 
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absolute predicative adjective is always measured on a nominal scale i.e. individual characteristics 
are grouped into a set of equivalence classes. 
 
 Let us know consider the case of an old person, apparently the adjective old seems absolute 
predicative too, but indeed it is not, because one could argue that old actually is dependent on the 
noun. If economists are, on average older than an average middle aged person, then an old 
economist is different from an old person. The point becomes clearer if one uses a different 
profession, e.g. if one refers to “an old basketball player” (statement b) it becomes clear that old in 
this kind of context can actually have a complete different meaning. The same way of reasoning 
applies to small, which Geach considers an attributive adjective. Clearly, a small elephant is not a 
small animal and a small basketball player (statement c) is not a small person; the meaning of this 
adjective changes over different subsets1, thus in formal logic terms, the law of the excluded 
middle is lost (since it is not true that e.g. a person is only young or old). An adjective is relative 
predicative if it does not hold its meaning once one switches to a larger or different set of objects. 
It describes a characteristic that is dependent on the relative comparisons among the objects 
considered.  In terms of measurement theory, a relative predicative adjective is always measured 
on an ordinal scale2. 
 
 An adjective is attributive if it does not have any meaning when referred to a different set or 
problem framework. A good person can be a bad basketball player and a good economist can be a 
bad person. Being good or bad depends also on the notion of quality used, which depends on the 
use connected to the object to be evaluated. For example, it is hard to defend that a good car is a 
good mean of transport to travel inside a city’s historical centre.  I agree with Geach that evaluative 
adjectives are always attributive. Given a claim that "x is better than y" a proper response is "x is 
better what than y?" Similar points can be made about the adjective "valuable" and "is more 
valuable than".  
 
 At this stage, the following conclusion can be derived: when considering adjectives, set 
commensurability is correct only if the adjectives considered are absolute predicative ones. An 
                                                 
1 This type of uncertainty can be modelled by using the concept of fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets, as formulated by Zadeh (1965), are based on 
the simple idea of introducing a degree of membership of an element with respect to some sets. Fuzzy uncertainty considers all cases 
between 0 (non-membership) and 1 (complete membership), and it is represented by means of the membership functions. Let us 
assume that the symbol U means the entire set (Universe of discourse). In classical set theory, given a subset   of U, each element 
x U satisfies the condition: either x belongs to  , or x does not belong to  . The subset   is represented by a function 
 : 0,1f U  . The function f  is called a characteristic function of the set  . Fuzzy sets are then introduced by generalizing the 
characteristic function f . Let U again be a universe of discourse with x U . Then a fuzzy set ? in U is a set of ordered pairs  
? , ( ) ,x x x U   where  ? :U   is a membership function which maps x U into ? ( )x  in a totally ordered set   
(called the membership set) and ? ( )x indicates the grade of membership of x in ? . Generally, the membership set is restricted to 
the closed interval [0, 1]. A fuzzy set is completely determined by its membership function.  By using fuzzy sets, a person may belong to 
the subsets of “old persons”, “middle aged” or “young persons” simultaneously, but of course with different degrees of membership. 
One has to note that although this modelling technique can be useful in practical situations, it does not allow the degree of precision 
needed by the theoretical concept of set commensurability. 
2 The word measurement is usually reserved for the situation in which a number is assigned to each observation; this number reflects a 
magnitude of some quantitative property (how to assign this number constitutes the so-called representation problem). The 
measurement procedure used constitutes a function rule :m O R , telling how to give an object o its m(o) value in a systematic way. 
Measurement operations or procedures differ in the information that the numerical measurements themselves provide about the true 
magnitudes. Let us suppose that there is a measurement procedure or rule for assigning a number m(o) to each object oO, and 
suppose that the following statements are true for any pair of objects o1 and o2 O: 
2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m o m o only if t o t o
m o m o only if t o t o
 
               (6) 
Any measurement procedure for which equation (6) applies is an example of ordinal scaling, or measurement at the ordinal level. Thus 
in comparing two basketball players x and y, we can state that x is smaller or older than y, but we cannot state anything about a third 
person z, with whom no pair-wise comparison was made.  
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adjective Z is absolute predicative if it passes the ontological check of the two following logical 
tests:  
 
(1) 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )if x Z x W x x Z x xW x       
(2) 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )if x Z x W x and if x W x V x then x Z x V x          
 
In plain language, test (1) implies statements such as “if 1x is red and it is a car then 1x is a red car” 
and test (2) “if 1x is a red car and all cars are a mean of transport then 1x  is a red mean of 
transport”. Adjectives that fail such tests are relative predicative or attributive adjectives which 
always imply weak comparability based on incommensurability. For example, the adjective “good” 
clearly fails (2), statements such as “ 1x is a good car, all cars are a mean of transport, and 
therefore 1x  is a good mean of transport” or “ 1x  is a good economist, all economists are human 
beings, and therefore 1x  is a good human being” are invalid arguments on the light of a real-world 
corroboration. 
 
 If evaluative adjectives like "good" and "valuable" are attributive in standard uses, that does not 
however preclude the possibility of rational choices between objects which do not fall into the 
range of a single comparative. Weak comparability based on incommensurability is compatible 
with the existence of such limited ranges; for example, urban quality of life is not evaluated as 
good or bad as such, but rather, as good, bad, beautiful or ugly in relation to different descriptions 
or indicators. It can be at one and the same time a "good average income" and a "bad social 
inclusion", a "beautiful skyline" and an "ugly cultural heritage". The use of these value terms in 
such contexts is attributive clearly.  
 
 Now let us go back to the case of relative predicative adjectives. One could argue that isn’t it 
true that there can be commensurability even where relative predicative adjectives are involved as 
long as one sticks to a single measurement unit?   So, going back to the example of big and small 
as relative predicative adjectives, the relative sizes of elephants and fleas are indeed 
commensurable as long as one considers a single measurement unit such as kilos, (or pounds), 
centimetres (or inches) in diameter and so on. The point here is then that adjectives are relative 
predicative but the property behind this type of adjective can in principle be measured exactly on 
a quantitative measurement scale3. Factual rod commensurability is based on this attempt to 
look for one existing property common to all objects to be compared and measurable by using one 
                                                 
3 Quantitative measurement procedures associate objects oO with a real number m(o) allowing much more precise statements about 
the true magnitudes than ordinal scale measurements. Suppose that the statement of equation (7) is true: 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,
m o m o only if t o t o
m o m o only if t o t o
t o x iff m o ax b where a R
 
 
   
              (7) 
That is, the numerical measurement m(o) is some affine function of the true magnitude x. When (7) applies, the measurement operation 
is called interval scaling, or measurement at the interval-scale level. When measurement is at the interval-scale level, any of the 
ordinary operations of arithmetic can be applied to the differences between numerical measurements, and the results can be interpreted 
as statements about magnitudes of the underlying property. It is sometimes possible to find measurement operations making the 
statement of Equation (8) true: 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,
m o m o only if t o t o
m o m o only if t o t o
t o x iff m o ax where a R
 
 
  
                          (8) 
When the measurement operation defines a function such as the statement contained in (8), then measurement is said to be at the 
ratio-scale level. For such scales, ratios of numerical measurements are unique and can be interpreted directly as ratios of magnitudes 
of objects.  
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measurement unit; obviously comparison of objects is possible according to the characteristics of 
this property only.  In a syllogistic form, the apples and oranges example could be put as follows: 
All consumer’s goods have a price on the market, all fruits on the market are consumer’s goods, 
then all fruits on the market have a price, apples and oranges are fruits on the market, thus they 
have a price by which can be compared. By using formal logic it is:  
 
 
11
22
1 1 12 2 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ))
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
M
M M
M
M
M
x x P xC
x x xCF
x x P xF
x A x xF
x O x xF
x A x xP
x O x xP
x x x x x xP P PP P P
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
   
                                                                       (9) 
 
There is no doubt that rod commensurability is very attractive, in its framework it is possible to 
make statements ontologically and logically correct on a quantitative scale of measurement and a 
complete pre-order  among objects to be evaluated can always be derived.  
 
 In economic terms a question immediately arises: is the search for the “common rod of money” 
useful? I do think it is very useful, but one has to have clear that money values are worth to be 
used when they are connected to one value and one institution only, i.e. economic efficiency and 
markets. They fail to incorporate other objectives and values.  
 
 Monetary valuation methods are based on phenomena such as consumer's surpluses, market 
failures, demand curves which are just a partial point of view, since connected with one institution 
and one value only: markets and efficiency. From a social point of view, issues connected with 
actions outside of markets and behaviour of people different from the class of consumers should 
also be taken into account. I believe that the point is not to be against giving economic value to 
natural resources, to human health (or even lives) or to cultural heritage. When one wishes to 
preserve a monument or a natural area, a fundamental question is: is there any resource which 
society is willing to assign to this objective? Indeed no society can avoid the economic problem of 
“opposition between tastes and obstacles”, as Pareto made clear. To answer this question the 
concept of total economic value4 becomes immediately relevant. To attribute monetary values to 
e.g. historical heritage implies to capture user (actual, option and bequest) and non-user 
(existential, symbolic, etc.) values. A location may be valuable for its biodiversity (measured in 
richness of species or genetic variety), and also as a landscape, and have also economic value 
(measured by the travel cost method or contingent valuation). These are different types of value. 
The point is that social decisions involve multiple types of values, of which economic efficiency is 
only one.  Therefore it is misleading to make social decisions based only on that one value. 
 
  The classical Adam Smith’s example on the value of diamonds versus water is relevant here. 
No doubt in a city environment everyone would prefer diamond over water, however in a different 
environment, e.g. a boat in the middle of the ocean, water has definitely a higher value than 
diamonds. Economic values depend on subjective human preferences, no discussion about this. 
Attempts to explain economic values through objective, context invariant categories such as 
                                                 
4 Although money values can be considered a form of factual rod commensurability, it is important to remember that to compute total 
economic values has nothing to do with the idea of a “true” or “correct” value. All monetary valuation attempts suffer deep philosophical 
problems (see e.g. Hansson, 2007; Sagoff, 1988) and technical uncertainties (see e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2009; Hansen, 2011; Martinez-
Alier et al., 1998; Vatn and Bromley, 1994) such as: 
 Which monetary valuation technique has to be used?  
 Which time horizon has to be considered?  
 Which social discount rate? 
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energy are an obvious non-sense. On the other side, e.g. Odum’s Emergy5 measures (Odum, 
1996) can be a good proxy of the ecological value of an ecosystem. Galapagos Islands have a 
higher ecological value than the Dutch Inside Sea surely, but the same does not necessarily apply 
to economic value (economic indeed would favour the Inside Sea, which, since totally eutrophised, 
offers an important economic service receiving all the nutrients coming from human activity). 
Different values, since they are related to different objectives and institutions, cannot be merged 
into only one metric, this is a very simple truth.   
 
 It is interesting to note that the consistency between measurement units and objectives applies 
even when two metrics are equivalent. A famous example is the one of energy and labour 
valuation in the Marxist theory of value (Martinez-Alier, 1987). Podolinski, an Ukrainian medical 
doctor, arrived at the conclusion that a human being in average can devote to work about 500 Kcal 
a day. This means that, by considering a human being as a thermal machine, 1/5 of Kcal coming 
from the food can be transformed into muscular effort, i.e. mechanical energy. Both Marx and 
Engels agreed with Podolinski’s argument that labour theory of value would be equivalent to 
energy theory of value, but they strongly rejected the possibility of substituting labour valuation with 
energy valuation. The reason is obvious, their ideological objective was to show that in a 
production process, there is exploitation of the workers by the capital; this message was easy to 
communicate in the framework of labour theory but totally unintelligible if an energy theory of value 
would be used, since the economy/society relationship is excluded completely.  
 
 Potential rod commensurability has two distinguishing characteristics:  
1) It is based on the search for one plausible common property among the objects to be evaluated, 
although this property is not necessarily recognizable in the real world.  
2) This common property tries to represent many dimensions simultaneously. 
 
 An example is the so-called ecological footprint sustainability index (Wackernagel and Rees, 
1995). The peculiar characteristic of this index is that it starts from the assumption that every 
category of energy and material consumption and waste discharge requires the productive or 
absorptive capacity of a finite area of land or water. If one sums up the land requirements for all 
categories of consumption and waste discharge of a defined population, the total area represents 
the ecological footprint of that population. The obvious problem here is that while in comparing 
apples and oranges, one can know their content in Kcal or their price, how can one know how 
much space is needed for their production? This is not an observable property; in this framework, 
the solution of the representation problem of measurement theory implies the use of scientifically 
sound conversion factors that can transform all various dimensions into land. These conversion 
factors necessarily depend on arbitrary assumptions on e.g. agricultural production system, 
biological productivity, characteristics of soil, age of trees, and so on. From an evaluation point of 
view, it is interesting to note that an intensive agricultural production system in this case is better 
than an extensive one. In fact energy based systems reduce the virtual space occupied by e.g. a 
city, but unfortunately, at the same time imply much more CO2 emissions and loss of biodiversity 
due to the use of fertilizers and pesticides and the introduction of exotic species. 
 
 One should observe that from a policy point of view, this kind of commensurability is very risky; 
since a multidimensional concept is compressed into a single dimension only, no consistency 
between policy objectives and the metric used exists anymore. For example, if sustainability is 
summarised into the ecological footprint, a rational policy would be to transform the Coliseum into 
a wooded area since this option decreases the ecological footprint of Rome! Clearly this index is 
an example of ecological reductionism where e.g. socio-economic and cultural aspects are 
completely neglected. Indeed in my opinion, the objective of this index is not policy, but 
communication. In fact its relative popularity is due to the fact that as a pedagogical tool, it is very 
understandable (space in terms of footprint) and its message very clear: humans should reduce 
their impact on the planet by changing their life style. Like in the case of Marx theory of value, the 
objective linked to the metric chosen is ideological.  
                                                 
5 Emergy is the “available solar energy used up directly and indirectly to make a service or product” (Odum, 1996, p. 8). 
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 Another illustration of potential rod commensurability is the use of shadow prices in 
macroeconomic environmental accounts. Here the objective is pragmatic, i.e. to account for 
environmental goods and services that have no price on the market. Prices are used not to 
implement efficiency but simply to aggregate different items of the so-called environmental capital 
(see e.g. Dasgupta, 2001; Pearce and Turner, 1990; World Bank, 2011). According to this scholar 
tradition, measurements of natural capital stock made exclusively in physical terms are problematic 
because of the difficulty in adding up different physical quantities expressed in different units. On 
the contrary, by valuing each resource stock in money terms, the total value of natural capital can 
be measured6. One obvious problem here is that many natural resources (e.g., air, water and 
wilderness) do not have observable prices. Even those prices that do exist may not be useful; they 
may be affected by market imperfections and taxes, and they may exclude externalities involved 
with the production and use of the resource. Thus one would need to find implicit or shadow prices 
in some way. 
 
Shadow prices have been invented for implementing the concept of “real opportunity cost” 
when a market for a good or service does not exist (e.g. the provision of many public goods), thus 
the ratios of shadow prices are marginal social rates of substitution among the various capital 
assets7. From a pure technical point of view, it is important to remember that shadow prices are 
primarily meant to implement efficiency, i.e. resource prices reflect conditions at the margin, and 
thus this is their natural objective. In the framework of sustainability, this may give rise to 
counterintuitive results. Let us imagine that the monetary value of a country natural capital stock 
has been properly measured and its value is known to policy-makers. When considering flows from 
a natural resource stock, where the resource flow is the product of price and quantity used, when 
quantity declines the corresponding shadow price unavoidably rises over time (being a function of 
its relative scarcity), at the same rate or faster than the rate of decrease in the physical stock of the 
natural resource. This implies that the value over time of the natural capital stock remains constant 
or may even rise, while the physical stock is declining; but unfortunately this physical scarcity will 
not be recognised by policy-makers since they have information on the value of the natural capital 
stock. 
 
 In summary, the point is that different metrics are linked to different objectives and values. To 
use only one measurement unit for incorporating a plurality of dimensions, objectives and values, 
implies reductionism necessarily.  
 
  
3. Implications of incommensurability for public policy: from welfare economics to well-
being economics 
 
   The world is characterised by deep complexity. This obvious observation has important 
implications on the manner in which policy problems are represented and decision-making is 
framed. Various authors claim that modern public economic policy needs to expand its empirical 
relevance by introducing more and more realistic (and of course more complex) assumptions in its 
models. In this context, one of the most interesting research directions in contemporary public 
economics, is the attempt of taking into account political constraints, interest groups and collusion 
effects explicitly (see e.g. Laffont, 2000, 2002; van Winden, 1999), as a consequence, 
transparency becomes an essential feature of public policies (Stiglitz, 2002). This implies that to 
reach a ranking of policy options, there is a previous need for deciding about what is important for 
                                                 
6 In terms of history of the economic thought, it is worthy to remember that the issues concerning the nature, role and measurement of 
capital goods was the focus of the so-called Cambridge controversy (Harcourt, 1972). Although the term capital was referred to artificial 
capital, the results can be extended to natural capital too, if money valuation is used, in particular the problem of circularity among the 
quantity of capital, its monetary value and the rate of interest. 
7 Indeed shadow prices were invented as a solution to the debate on economic calculus in a socialist economy. Hayek, replying to 
Neurath wrote (1935, p. 31):  "Neurath was quite oblivious of the insuperable difficulties which the absence of value calculations would 
put in the way of any rational economic use of the resources...". Or, as Von Mises had put it (Von Mises, 1920, in Hayek, ed. 1935, p. 
111), "Where there is no free market, there is no pricing mechanism; without a pricing mechanism, there is no economic calculation". 
Kantorovich (1939) found a possible solution to this dilemma by inventing shadow prices. 
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different social actors as well as what is relevant for the representation of the real-world entity 
described in the model.  
 
 In the framework of public policy, it is important to further distinguish the concepts of social 
incommensurability and technical incommensurability (Munda, 2004). Social incommensurability 
refers to the existence of a multiplicity of legitimate values in society. Any social decision problem 
is characterised by conflicts between competing values and interests and different groups and 
communities that represent them. Choosing any particular operational definition for value and its 
corresponding valuation technique involves making a decision about what is important and real. 
Distributional issues play a central role (Olson, 1982). Any policy option always implies winners 
and losers, thus it is important to check if a policy option seems preferable just because some 
dimensions (e.g. the environmental) or some social groups (e.g. the lower income groups) are not 
taken into account.  
 
 Accepting low values for a negative externality that provokes an impact on poor community is a 
"political decision", far from being ethically neutral. Some years ago, an internal document of the 
World Bank, subsequently made public, suggested that toxic waste should be located in Africa, 
since the cost of the compensation was extremely low and therefore such solution has to be 
considered as the most efficient one. One should note that the issue of value free Science is a key 
issue for real-world policy and not a philosophical debate only. For example, an influential 
economist claimed that his work for the intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
where lives of people in rich countries are valued up to fifteen times higher than those in poor 
countries, was a matter of scientific correctness versus political correctness. (New Scientist, 19 
August, 1995). Is it really a matter of value free scientific correctness to use valuations based on 
assessments of a community's willingness and ability to pay to avoid risks of death8? I believe that 
both Kaldor and Hicks would answer no to this question. They stated clearly: “… it is quite 
impossible to decide on economic grounds what particular pattern of income-distribution 
maximises social welfare” (Kaldor, 1939, p. 551); “… there will be an indefinite number of different 
possible optima, distinguished from one another by differences in the distribution of social wealth” 
(Hicks, 1939, p. 701). 
  
 The new nature of the problems faced in this third millennium (e.g., food security, genetic 
modified organisms, climate change, … ), implies that very often, when deciding on problems that 
may have long term consequences, we are confronting issues “where facts are uncertain, values in 
dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991). An obvious question is 
then who has the power to simply complexity? In this case, scientists cannot provide any useful 
input without interacting with the rest of society and the rest of the society cannot perform any 
sound decision making without interacting with the scientists.  That is, the question of “how to 
improve the quality of a policy process” must be put, quite quickly, on the agenda of “scientists”, 
“policy makers” and indeed the whole society. This extension of the “peer community” is essential 
for maintaining the quality of the process of policy-making when dealing with real-world complex 
systems. The fact that “one's welfare economics will inevitably be different according as one is a 
liberal or a socialist, a nationalist or an internationalist, a christian or a pagan” (Hicks, 1939, p. 696) 
is the normal state of affairs in policy decisions. I do not see any reason why this issue of existence 
of a plurality of values should be considered a problem that can be solved by considering 
consumers’ preferences as the only relevant social values. Sagoff (1988) made clear the point that 
one’s preferences as a consumer may differ from one’s preferences as a citizen significantly. In my 
opinion, it is much more scientific an approach which deals with such a plurality of values than one 
which solve all conflicts by imposing a perspective considered superior on some ethical or 
technical grounds.  
 
 
                                                 
8 One has to note that the issue is not maintaining that a human life has infinite value; for example, a reduction in road accidents can be 
secured at some cost, but society is unlikely to devote the whole of the national income to this end. The point is that often this valuation 
is made implicitly and stating that is a technical issue, when it is a political one instead. 
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 Technical incommensurability comes from the multidimensional nature of policy issues.  
The existence of different dimensions, levels and scales at which a hierarchical system can be 
analyzed implies the unavoidable existence of non-equivalent descriptions of it. As discussed by 
Giampietro (2003) even a simple “objective” description of a geographical orientation is impossible 
without taking an arbitrary subjective decision on the system scale considered relevant. In fact the 
same geographical place, e.g., in the USA, may be considered to be in the north, south, east or 
west according to the scale chosen as a reference point (the whole USA, a single state and so 
on)9. One should note that the construction of a descriptive model of a real-world system depends 
on very strong assumptions about (1) the purpose of this construction, e.g. to evaluate well-being 
or sustainability (2) the scale of analysis, e.g. a city, a region or a country and (3) the set of 
dimensions, objectives and indicators used for the evaluation process. A reductionist approach for 
building a descriptive model can be defined as the use of just one measurable indicator (e.g. GDP 
per capita), one dimension (e.g. economic), one scale of analysis (e.g. region), one objective (e.g. 
the maximisation of economic efficiency) and one time horizon. If one wants to avoid reductionism, 
there is a clear need to take into account incommensurable dimensions using different scientific 
languages coming from different legitimate representations of the same system. This is what 
Neurath (1973) called the need for an “orchestration of sciences” (advocacy of interdisciplinarity 
and plurality of visions and judgement can also be found in Colander, 1994 and Hansen, 2011).  
 
   In summary, I think that instead of focusing on "missing markets" as a source of theoretical and 
empirical problems, or trying to explain economic values by means of energy or other common rod 
measures (clearly a non-sense from an economic point of view), we should focus on the creative 
power that missing markets have, because they push us away from commensurability towards a 
multidimensional evaluation of evolving realities10 implementing the incommensurability principle. 
This is the reason why I prefer to use the term Well-Being Economics instead of “Welfare 
Economics of Well-Being” suggested by Arrow et al., 2012.  
 
 I believe we can accept as true the statement that incommensurability does not imply 
incomparability; on the contrary incommensurability is the only rational way to compare various 
objects under different methodological assumptions than maximisation or optimisation (Sen, 1997, 
2000; Sen and Williams, 1982). It is in terms of weak comparability that evaluation has to take 
place in practice. Evaluation of objects relative to different descriptions invokes not just different 
practices and perspectives, but also the different criteria and standards for evaluation associated 
with these. It presupposes value-pluralism. This is exactly the basic idea of multi-criteria 
evaluation, which can be considered a form of applied consequentialism11. Weak comparability can 
therefore be implemented by using multi-criteria evaluation. In empirical evaluations of public 
projects and public provided goods, multi-criteria evaluation seems to be an adequate policy tool 
since it allows taking into account a wide variety of evaluation criteria (e.g. environmental impact, 
distributional equity, and so on) and not simply profit maximisation, as a private economic agent 
would mainly do.  
 
 The basic idea of multi-criteria evaluation is that in evaluation problems, we have first to 
establish objectives, i.e. the direction of the desired changes of the world (e.g. maximise profits, 
minimise environmental impact, minimise social exclusion, etc.) and then find useful practical 
indicators (called criteria). The evaluation criterion is the basis for evaluation in relation to a given 
objective. It is a function that associates each alternative with a variable indicating its desirability 
according to expected consequences related to the same objective, e.g. GDP, saving rate and 
inflation rate inside the objective “growth maximization”. The criterion score is a constructed 
measure stemming from a process that represents, at a given point in space and time, a shared 
                                                 
9 These multiple-identity/multiple-scale systems can be defined as “Learning Holarchies”. A “holon” is a whole made of smaller parts 
(e.g. a human being made of organs, tissues, cells, atoms) and at the same time it forms a part of a larger whole (an individual human 
being is a part of a household, a community, a country, the global economy) (see Koestler, 1969). 
10 "There is great pressure for research into techniques to make larger ranges of social value commensurable. Some of the effort should 
rather be devoted to learning - or learning again, perhaps - how to think intelligently about conflicts of value which are 
incommensurable" (Williams, 1972, p. 103). A call for dealing explicitly with incommensurability can also be found in Arrow (1997). 
11 Here I disagree with Hansson (2007, p. 163) who considers cost-benefit analysis” the only well-developed form of applied 
consequentialism”. 
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perception of a real-world state of affairs consistent with a given criterion. To give an example, 
when comparing two countries, within the economic dimension, one objective could be 
“maximization of economic growth”; the criterion might be R&D performance, the criterion score 
could be “number of patents per million of inhabitants”.  Valuation can then be referred to the 
process by which a criterion score is constructed. Since in general, objectives are in conflict, multi-
criteria mathematical aggregation rules look for so-called compromise solutions. 
 
 In formal terms discrete multi-criteria evaluation problems can be described in the following way 
(Arrow and Raynaud, 1986; Roy, 1996; Figueira et al., 2005): A is a finite set of N feasible options; 
M is the number of different points of view or evaluation criteria gm  m=1, 2, ... , M considered 
relevant in an evaluation problem, where the option a is evaluated to be better than option b (both 
belonging to the set A) according to the m-th point of view if gm(a)>gm(b). This information can be 
synthesised in a matrix called evaluation or impact matrix (see Table 1). 
 
  Alternative
s 
   
Criteria Units a1 a2 a3 a4 
g1  g1(a1) g1(a2) . g1(a4) 
g2  . . . . 
g3  . . . . 
g4  . . . . 
g5  . . . . 
g6  g6(a1) g6(a2) . g6(a4) 
 
Table 1. Example of an Impact Matrix 
 
 
In summary, the information contained in the impact matrix useful for solving12 the so-called multi-
criterion problem is: 
 Intensity of preference (when quantitative criterion scores are present). 
 Number of criteria in favour of a given alternative. 
 Weight attached to each single criterion. 
 Relationship of each single alternative with all the other alternatives. 
 
In 1986 Kenneth Arrow and Hervé Raynaud published a very influential book titled “Social 
choice and multicriterion decision-making”, where the formal analogies between the discrete 
multi-criterion problem and the social choice one are analysed deeply. This book is based on 
the assumption that, in the case where all criteria have ordinal impact scores, if one considers 
the evaluation criteria as voters, a multi-criteria impact matrix and a voting matrix are identical. 
As a consequence all results of social choice also apply to multi-criteria decision theory fully (at 
least when no intensity of preference and no indifference/preference thresholds13 are used; for a 
                                                 
12 In a discrete multi-criteria problem, there is a range of multi-criteria problem formulations, which may take one of the following forms 
(Roy, 1996): 
(α) the aim is to identify one and only one final alternative; 
(β) the aim is the assignment of each alternative to an appropriate predefined category according to what one wants it to become 
afterwards (for instance, acceptance, rejection or delay for additional information); 
(γ) the aim is to rank all feasible alternatives according to a total or partial pre-order; 
(δ) the aim is to describe relevant alternatives and their consequences. 
13 By introducing a positive constant indifference threshold q the resulting preference model is the threshold model: 








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)()(
)()(   
 
where aj and ak belong to the set A of alternatives and gm to the set G of evaluation criteria. 
The famous bold paradox in Greek philosophy (how many hairs one has to cut off to transform a person with hairs to a bold one?), later 
on Poincaré (1935, p. 69) and finally Luce (1956) made the point that the transitivity of indifference relation is incompatible with the 
existence of a sensibility threshold below which an agent either does not sense the difference between two elements, or refuses to 
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recent discussion of these technical issues see Munda, 2012a,b).  However in my opinion, the 
relations between social choice and multi-criteria evaluation are stronger than the simple 
mathematical analogy. In fact I consider that multi-criteria evaluation is a type of applied 
democracy when it is used for evaluating policy options, this is the main idea behind Social 
Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE) (Munda, 2004, 2008).  
 
As a tool for conflict management, SMCE has demonstrated its usefulness in many policy 
problems in various geographical and cultural contexts (see e.g. Gamboa, 2006; Garmendia 
and Stagl, 2010; Monterroso et al., 2011; Munda and Russi, 2008; Özkaynak, 2008; Scolobig et 
al., 2008; Soma and Vatn, 2009; Straton et al., 2010; Zendehdel et al., 2010 ).  The main point 
of force is the fact that the use of various evaluation criteria has a direct translation in terms of 
plurality of values used in the evaluation exercise. From this point of view, social multi-criteria 
evaluation can be considered as a tool for implementing political democracy. Social multi-criteria 
evaluation puts its emphasis on the transparency issue; the main idea being that results of an 
evaluation exercise depends on the way a given policy problem is structured and thus the 
assumptions used, the ethical positions taken, and the interests and values considered have to 
be made clear. In this framework, mathematical models still play a very important role: the one 
of guaranteeing consistency between assumptions used and results obtained.  
 
Finally, one should note that these considerations apply at a macro level of analysis too.  Since 
well-being is a multidimensional concept, in evaluating the performance of a region, country or 
even a continent, a plurality of indicators is needed. Often, some indicators improve while others 
deteriorate (Nardo et al., 2008). This is the classical conflictual situation dealt with in multi-
criteria evaluation. In a macroeconomic framework too, it is essential to identify how countries or 
regions improve or decline under certain assumptions, and to help the framing of the debate 
around the conceptual framework used, i.e. which representation of reality (and thus which 
societal values and interests) has been taken into consideration (for a technical treatise see e.g. 
Munda, 2005; Munda and Nardo, 2009).  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
  In proportion to a more or less complete acceptance of the arguments presented here, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1. Well-being is a multidimensional concept, thus a key research topic is on how we can 
measure and evaluate this plurality of dimensions for policy decisions. In the literature two 
main approaches exist: strong and weak comparability. 
 
2. Commensurability, a necessary condition for strong comparability, can be implemented by 
means of “set commensurability” and “rod commensurability”.  Both of them are not of a 
general applicability. Set commensurability can be applied only when absolute predicative 
adjectives are considered. Potential rod commensurability is very risky since it attempts to 
“invent” a plausible common property which synthesises many dimensions at the same 
time. Factual rod commensurability is always implied by a valuation exercise; it is desirable 
but one has to remember that e.g. monetary valuation methods are based on one institution 
only: markets. From a social point of view, issues connected with actions outside of 
markets and behaviour of people different from the class of consumers should also be 
taken into account. It is misleading to take social decisions based on only one type of 
value.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
declare a preference for one or the other. Luce was the first one to discuss this issue formally in the framework of preference modelling. 
Mathematical characterisations of preference modelling with thresholds can be found in Roubens and Vincke (1985). 
 
  
Page 15 of 17 
 
3. Monetary valuation techniques are the only ones that can answer these two questions: 1) 
How many resources society is willing to devote to a given objective? 2) How much society 
has to pay for compensation after e.g. an accident? Their desirability in this context is not 
questioned here. 
 
4. Different metrics are linked to different objectives and values. To use only one 
measurement unit for incorporating a plurality of objectives and values, implies 
reductionism necessarily. 
 
5. Weak comparability of values, which is grounded on incommensurability, can be 
considered the main methodological foundation of evaluation and policy in the framework of 
well-being economics. Incommensurability does not imply incomparability; on the contrary 
incommensurability is the only rational way to compare societal options under a plurality of 
policy objectives.  
 
6. Weak comparability can be implemented by using multi-criteria evaluation, which is a 
formal framework for applied consequentialism under incommensurability. Social Multi-
Criteria Evaluation, in particular, allows considering both technical and social 
incommensurability simultaneously.  
 
7. We can define evaluation as the combination of representation (social actors, criteria, 
weights and actions considered), valuation (construction of criterion scores), mathematical 
aggregation (properties of the algorithms used) and quality check (transparency of the 
steps by which both technical and social commensurability have been tackled) connected 
to a given policy problem. 
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